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Abstract 
 
From Avicenna and Descartes a long debate on the role of mind-body dilemma 
has left a huge impact on ethics of psychological research. That is especially 
applicable on researches that include both human and non-human participants, 
as well as their limitations and constraints that are connected to ethical 
principles. However, these principles are closely related to the interpretation of 
mind-body dilemma, which depends on different understandings of connection 
between soul and senses. The purpose of this paper is to examine the major 
impact of well-known “mind-body” dualism on ethics in psychological 
researches, with special emphasis on neuropsychology and neuroscience in 
general, as well as major constraints related to that dillema. The thought 
experiment has been recognized as a precursor to Rene Descartes’ famous 
‘Cogito ergo sum’, as well as his body-mind dilemma. However, Avicenna's 
argument is more intended to demonstrate conceptually that Aristotle’s 
empirical axiom “there is nothing in the mind which was not first in the senses” 
is mistaken, since there is at least one thing in the mind which is not contingent 
upon experience, and that is self-awareness. The major contribution of this 
paper is the inclusion of two philosophical debates on mind-body dilemma 
while considering ethical approaches to neuropsychological research on both 
human and non-human participants.  
Keywords: Ethics; Neuroscience; Dualism; Mind-body Dillema; Human and 
Non-human Participants 
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Introduction 
According to Avicenna theoretical psychology lies outside 
the province of the physician qua physician. In his experiment 
which he called the “flying man” or the ‘floating’ man, found at 
the beginning of his Fi’-Nafs/De Anima (Treatise on the Soul), he 
asks us to imagine a human being with absolutely no sensory 
experience. According to Avicenna's opinion, the only thing this 
person with no experiences would know is that she/he himself 
exists. Therefore, person would be aware of herself/himself (self-
aware) quite apart from experiences of other things which stand in 
some relation to her/him. 
The thought experiment has been recognized as a 
precursor to Rene Descartes’ famous ‘Cogito ergo sum’, as well 
as his body-mind dilemma. However, Avicenna's argument is 
more intended to demonstrate conceptually that Aristotle’s 
empirical axiom “there is nothing in the mind which was not first 
in the senses” is mistaken, since there is at least one thing in the 
mind which is not contingent upon experience, and that is self-
awareness.  
Suspended in such a state, person is not able to affirm the 
existence of her/his body because she/he is not empirically aware 
of it, thus the argument may be seen as affirming the 
independence of the soul from the body, a form of dualism. 
However, there is a subject that is thinking, so she/he cannot 
doubt that self exists therefore the argument can be seen as an 
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affirmation of the self-awareness of the soul and its substantiality. 
This argument does raise an objection, which may be applicable 
to different understandings of ethics in neuroscientific research: 
how do we know that the knowing subject is the self and what the 
major differences and ethical constraints between human and non-
human participants are.  
Avicenna's Psychology and Descartes' Dualism 
Avicenna's interest in classical psychology is primarily 
embodied in the Kitab al-nafs parts of his Kitab al-shifa' (The 
Book of Healing) and Kitab al-najat (The Book of Deliverance), 
which were known in Latin under the title De Anima. The main 
thesis of these tracts is represented in his “thought experiment”, 
also known as "flying man" argument, which resonates with what 
was centuries later entailed by Descartes's cogito argument (Nader 
El-Bizri, 2003). 
Avicenna's psychology requires that connection between 
the body and soul should be strong enough to ensure the soul's 
individuation, but weak enough to allow for its immortality 
(Rahman, 1981, 40). His psychology is based on physiology, 
which reveals that his understanding of the soul is one that deals 
almost entirely with the natural science of the body and its 
abilities of perception. Therefore, the major connection between 
the soul and body is explained by his understanding of perception, 
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where bodily perception interrelates with the immaterial human 
intellect (Rahman, 1981, 40).  
The perceiver senses the form of the object first by 
perceiving features of the object by our external senses, but 
sensory information is supplied to the internal senses, which 
merge all the pieces into a whole, unified conscious experience. 
This process of perception and abstraction is the nexus of the soul 
and body, for the material body may only perceive material 
objects, while the immaterial soul may only receive the 
immaterial, universal forms, therefore the soul and body interact 
in the final abstraction of the universal (Rahman, 1981, 41). 
The soul completes the action of intellection by accepting 
forms that have been abstracted from matter, which means that a 
concrete particular (material) must be abstracted into the universal 
intelligible (immaterial) (Rahman, 1981, 68-69). Both of them 
continue interaction through the Active Intellect, which is a 
"divine light" containing the intelligible forms (Rahman, 1981, 
68-69). Reason is designed material (or hylic), possible or 
habitual, and it may be called  “material” either in the pure sense, 
by analogy with the pure matter, which in itself is entirely 
formless but is the substratum of all possible forms (Fakhry, 2004, 
145).  
The most lasting legacies of Descartes’ philosophy are his 
thesis that mind and body are really distinct entities. That thesis is 
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now called “mind-body dualism”. He argues that the nature of the 
mind is completely different from that of the body, and therefore 
it is possible for one to exist without the other. This argument 
gives rise to some of the intriguing questions, such as: how can 
the mind cause some of our bodily limbs to move, and how can 
the body’s sense organs cause sensations in the mind.  
In the Second Meditation, Descartes argues that he is 
“thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is 
unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions” 
(Descartes, 1985, 19). Neither a mind can be understood to be 
shaped or in motion, nor can a body understand or sense anything. 
However, human beings are combinations of mind and body such 
that the mind’s choices can cause modes of motion in the body, 
and motions in certain bodily organs.  
According to Descartes, a clear and distinct understanding 
of the mind without the body exists. Since the mind must have a 
surface and a capacity for motion, the mind must also be extended 
and, therefore, mind and body are not completely different. Even 
though he never described this problem clearly, Descartes himself 
never took this issue very seriously: 
“These questions presuppose amongst other things an 
explanation of the union between the soul and the body, 
which I have not yet dealt with at all. But I will say, for your 
benefit at least, that the whole problem contained in such 
questions arises simply from a supposition that is false and 
cannot in any way be proved, namely that, if the soul and the 
body are two substances whose nature is different, this 
(				 

"
	 
!"#
$%&'	(	
prevents them from being able to act on each other.” 
(Descartes 1985, 275). 
It is evident that his response to mind-body problem 
presupposes an explanation of the union between these two 
entities, as well as the false presupposition that two substances 
with completely different natures cannot act on each other.  
          „Flying Man“ vs „Cogito“ 
One cannot fail to note the striking similarities between the 
flying man and Rene Descartes' cogito six centuries later 
(Kaukua, 2007, 14). Avicenna's most general definition of the 
soul conceives it as a perfection of a living body, but it is 
important to allow differences between the souls of animals and 
plants on the one hand, and the souls of human beings and the 
celestian spheres on the other hand (Kaukua, 2007, 24). 
Avicenna’s epistemology is based on a theory of soul that 
is independent of the body and capable of abstraction. This proof 
for the self in many ways prefigures by 600 years the Cartesian 
cogito and the modern philosophical notion of the self (Black, 
2008, 65). It somehow demonstrates the Aristotelian base and 
Neoplatonic structure of his psychology. The so-called ‘flying 
man’ argument or thought experiment found at the beginning of 
his Fi’-Nafs/De Anima (Treatise on the Soul) can serve as one of 
the examples: 
“We say: one of us must imagine himself as creates all at 
once an perfect but with his sight veiled from observing 
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external things, and as created floating in the air or the void 
so that he would not encounter air resistance which he would 
have to sense, and with his limbs separate from each other in 
such a way that they neither meet nor touch each other. He 
must then reflect upon (the question) whether he would 
affirm the existence of his essence…” (Rahman 1959, 36) 
The main question is: If a person were created in a perfect 
state, but blind and suspended in the air but unable to perceive 
anything through his senses, would he be able to affirm the 
existence of his self? Suspended in such a state, he cannot affirm 
the existence of his body because he is not empirically aware of it, 
thus the argument may be seen as affirming the independence of 
the soul from the body, which represents a form of dualism. But in 
that state he cannot doubt that his self exists because there is a 
subject that is thinking, thus the argument can be seen as an 
affirmation of the self-awareness of the soul and its substantiality 
(Black, 2008, 66). The same objection may also be posed at 
Descartes: how do we know that the knowing subject is the self? 
This rational self possesses faculties or senses in a theory 
that begins with Aristotle and develops through Neoplatonism. 
According to Avicenna, the first sense is common sense, the 
second sense is imagination, the third sense is the imaginative 
faculty, the fourth sense is estimation, and the final sense is where 
the ideas produced are stored and analyzed and ascribed meanings 
based upon the production of the imaginative faculty and 
estimation (Fakhry, 2004). 
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The last move in Avicenna’s “Thought experiment” is 
slightly problematic, since it seems to contain the obviously 
fallacious inference pattern, “If I know x but I do not know y, then 
x cannot be the same as y” (Black, 2008, 11). The question of 
whether Avicenna explicitly or implicitly commits this fallacy, 
(which is often laid against the Cartesian cogito as well), has been 
much discussed. However, while the Flying Man argument 
focuses primarily on the impossibility that self-awareness is a 
mode of sense perception, the primitive character of the 
experience exemplified in the Flying Man poses parallel and equal 
difficulties for the claim that it could be a mode of intellectual 
understanding as well (Black 2008, 12). 
          Ethics of Human Soul 
Avicenna’s particular interest was in the persistence of the 
Soul’s consciousness of itself and its identity throughout the 
changing cycle of psychic conditions and states, from dreaming to 
intoxication to sleep (Fakhry, 2004, 164). According to him, even 
if the Soul is supposed to have been suspended in the air, and 
without any contact with the body or the external world, it would 
still be fully unconscious of anything but the fact of its existence. 
By this fact, existence and identity are achieved at once.  
The Soul itself is the basis, of the entire motive, cognitive 
or the vital functions we associate with it, and as such is logically 
prior to all these functions (Fakhry, 2004, 164). This concept is 
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pretty similar to Descartes’ cogito, and the similarity has been 
noted by many scholars. Also, both Aristotle and Plotinus had 
insisted on the unity or identity of the Soul and the fact that, in its 
inner and outer functions, motive and cognitive, it is diversified 
purely accidentally (Fakhry, 2004, 164).  
Avicenna claims that human souls are subsistent entities in 
their own right, and yet, since there are multiple individuals in the 
species “human”, those individuals can only been distinguished 
from one another by the diversity of their matter (Black, 2008, 
77). But in that situation, what is happening to the souls of both 
human and non-human participants in neuropsychological 
researches? Is there possibility for researcher to distinguish causes 
and effects, or, to be sure that the knowing subject is aware? Are 
there difference between human and animal self-awareness, and, 
in the same line, differences in ethical principles that should be 
applied before conducting neuropsychological research on human 
and/or non-human participants? 
According to the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and 
Code of Conduct (2010), “psychologist conducting intervention 
research involving the use of experimental treatments clarify to 
participants at the outset of the research (1) the experimental 
nature of the treatment; (2) the services that will or will not be 
available to the control group(s) if appropriate; (3) the means by 
which assignment to treatment and control groups will be made; 
(4) available treatment alternatives if an individual does not whish 
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to participate in the research or wishes to withdraw once a study 
has begun; and (5) compensation for or monetary costs of 
participating including, if appropriate, whether reimbursement 
from the participant or a third –party payor will be sought” 
(Standards 8.02b, Research and Publication, Informed Consent to 
Research).  
However, there is no informed consent when it comes to 
the non-human participants, but the Ethical Principles of 
Psychologists and Code of Conduct (2010) contains parts 
describing “Human Care and Use of Animals in Research”, as 
follows: 
(a) Psychologists acquire, care for, use, and dispose of animals in 
compliance with current federal, state and local laws and 
regulations, and with professional standards. 
(b) Psychologists trained in research methods and experienced in 
the care of laboratory animals supervise all procedures involving 
animals and are responsible for ensuring appropriate consideration 
of their comfort, health and humane treatment. 
(c) Psychologists ensure that all individuals under their 
supervision who are using animals have received instruction in 
research methods and in the care, maintenance and handling of the 
species being used, to the extent appropriate to their role. 
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(d) Psychologists make reasonable efforts to minimize the 
discomfort, infection, illness and pain of animal subjects. 
(e) Psychologists use a procedure subjecting animals to pain, 
stress or privation only when an alternative procedure is 
unavailable and the goal is justified by its prospective scientific, 
educational or applied value. 
(f) Psychologists perform surgical procedures under appropriate 
anesthesia and follow techniques to avoid infection and minimize 
pain during and after surgery. 
(g) When it is appropriate that an animal's life be terminated, 
psychologists proceed rapidly, with an effort to minimize pain and 
in accordance with accepted procedures. 
However, it is evident that research ethics of non-human 
participants relies upon discomfort, illness, harms, while research 
ethics of human participants includes informed consent and basic 
information on research provided by researcher. Ethical standards 
do not include data on human and non-human souls, “knowing 
subject” and its ability to inform researcher of his/her/its states of 
awareness, as well as ethical considerations of interpretations of 
research results. It is a commonplace in the history of philosophy 
that issues surrounding self-awareness, consciousness, and self-
knowledge do not become prominent until the early modern 
period, since for medieval philosophers, particularly those in the 
Aristotelian tradition, the nature of self-knowledge plays only an 
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ancillary role in psychology and epistemology (Black, 2008, 63). 
This is a natural consequence of Aristotle’s characterization of the 
intellect as a pure capacity that has no nature of its own, therefore 
self-knowledge for Aristotle is derivative upon knowledge of 
other things, and thought is itself thinkable in exactly the same 
way as its objects are (Black 2008, 64). 
States of Awareness: How Do We Know that the 
Knowing Subject Is the Self? 
Avicenna recognizes two distinct levels of self-knowledge, 
the most basic of which is exemplified in the experience of the 
Flying Man, which Deborah Black labeled “primitive self-
awareness” (Black, 2008, 69). Primitive self-awareness violates 
many of the structures placed on self-knowledge by the 
Aristotelian principles, and Avicenna differentiates it from the 
reflexive awareness of oneself via one’s awareness of an object 
that is characteristic of Aristotelianism (Black, 2008, 69). He also 
distinguishes primitive self-awareness from our knowledge of our 
bodies and psychological faculties and from our scientific 
understanding of our essential natures as humans; and he 
explicitly recognizes the capacity for “knowing that we know” as 
a distinctive form of self-knowledge (Black, 2008, 70).  
It remains unclear whether Avicenna is able to provide a 
coherent account of the relations among primitive self-awareness 
and the other varieties of self-knowledge that he inherits from the 
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Aristotelian tradition, but the broad contours of the Flying Man 
are generally well-known. Through that experiment, Avicenna 
identifies two fundamental sources of sense knowledge: 
everything previously acquired from experience, that is, all 
knowledge anchored in memory and imagination, and any 
ocurrent sensations (Black, 2008, 70).  
Avicenna beliefs that no one would deny that his/her 
awareness of himself/herself would remain stable even in these 
conditions, therefore the subject would continue to affirm the 
existence of his self. Despite the fact that all sense perception is 
cut off, person is aware of his/her existence, and affirmation of 
our existence cannot be dependent upon the experience of having 
a body. Avicenna thus concludes that since “it is not possible for 
the thing of which one is aware and not aware to be one in any 
respect,” it follows that the self cannot be either the whole body 
nor any one of its parts (Black, 2008, 74).  
Insofar as the growth of the human body involves 
development of its faculties, and insofar as consequent changes in 
self-world relations are brought about through learning based on 
both exteroception and proprioception, these changes concern the 
corresponding dispositions in the intellect (Kaukua, 2007, 143). 
Corporeal awareness relies on perceptual functions (e.g., tactile, 
proprioceptive, gravitational, visual) and motor programs for 
bodily actions (Knoblich et al., 2006, 171). Also, picture of other 
people’s bodies give rise to physical and emphatic responses in a 
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way that no text can produce (Knoblich et al., 2006, 136). 
Experimental paradigms have proves useful in elucidating the 
neuropsychological mechanisms underlying phantom-limb 
experiences, especially for the hemiphantom or phantom half-
body (the experience of a defferented/deefferente half of one’s 
body as an entity living a life on its own, and autoscopic 
phenomena in which one’s entire body is experienced as a 
phantom (Knoblich et al., 2006, 172). 
According to Avicenna, there are four basic requirements 
related to the concept of self-awareness: radical temporal 
continuity of self-awareness, non-reflectivity of self-awareness, 
immediacy of self-awareness, and lack of inherent objective 
content of self-awareness (Kaukua 2007, 102). However, 
Avicennian animals are capable of intentional apprehension of 
perceptible objects, therefore one can assume he is not denying 
the primitive type of self-awareness in animals (Kaukua, 2007, 
112). If phenomenality is taken as a mental feature. then Descartes 
would have to deny any kind of awareness from animals and 
argues that animals can feel but that there is no sense of what it is 
like in this animal capacity of feeling (Morris 2000). However, 
difference between Avicenna and Descartes is quite obvious, and 
Avicennian animals are more “Aristotelian” animate beings. 
If animals are primitively self-aware in much the same 
sense as humans, than it seems they should both adhere to the 
same ethical standards and guidelines prior to neuropsychological 
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research. Since animals cannot provide informed consent, 
experiments should be organized in a way to include zero harm. 
However, interpretation of results and conclusions should be 
analyzed seriously, since one cannot be sure if the knowing 
subject(s) is(are) the Self. Whereas in humans the account of 
primitive self-awareness was most intimately connected to the 
individuated existence of the incorporeal human soul, this cannot 
be true of animals whose souls are material souls (Kaukua 2007, 
114). However, there is no essential difference between animal 
and human self-awareness. The only difference that should be 
taken into account is that human self-awareness possesses 
capacity of taking itself as object of consideration (Kaukua 2007, 
117). 
Conclusion 
The main purpose of this essay was to examine different 
approaches to human soul and self-awareness provided by 
Avicenna and Descartes in order to examine its influence on 
ethics of neuropsychological researches conducted on both human 
and non-human participants. 
According to the ethical standards informed consent is 
necessary for human participants, while researches conducted on 
non-human participants should exclude harm and life-threatening 
situations (same is for human participants as well). However, 
differences between human and animal soul according to 
Avicennian psychology do not imply huge differences when it 
comes to ethical standards and guidelines for human and non-
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human participants. Since awareness is in its essence innate, 
knowing subject should be considered as a soul that is aware if its 
action in governing the body of both humans and non-humans. 
Therefore, the interpretation of neuropsychological experiments 
as well as results should be analyzed through the constraints of 
researcher to understand the dualism of mind and body united in 
self-awareness of knowing subject. 
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